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INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS AS DISRUPTERS OF 
CORRUPTION: BUSINESS AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN AFRICA’S MOST POPULOUS 
COUNTRY—NIGERIA 
Jayanth K. Krishnan1* 
ABSTRACT—Be it bribery, embezzlement, or the abuse of public trust, 
corruption poses a major challenge to global security and democratic 
governance, along with undermining the rule of law, especially within the 
Global South. Key to this phenomenon is understanding how lawyers are 
enabling but also disrupting this epidemic. Unfortunately, the literature on 
this subject is lacking. This study, therefore, offers a nuanced story of 
globalization and the complicated role that lawyers play in corruption, by 
relying on the case study of Nigeria—a crucial Global South market that has 
the largest population on the African continent. While Nigeria has been able 
to remain a democracy since 1999 (albeit fragilely), private sector and 
government officials, including the current Nigerian president, concede that 
corruption is the country’s biggest problem. At the same time, as this study 
demonstrates, in Nigeria today there is a small but growing group of globally 
experienced lawyers who are aggressively resisting the entrenched 
corruption that besieges this environment. By virtue of the opportunities 
provided by globalization, this cohort is not bound to the parochial interests 
that have long harmed Nigeria. Yet, these lawyers also work within a larger 
profession that is conservative, complicated, and at times itself corrupt. Thus, 
to what extent do these factors affect the ability of these globally focused 
lawyers to enact change? The answer to this question is critical because it 
helps to unlock an enduring puzzle as to which agents are best situated to 
lead a country out of its mired, corrupt history and onto the global stage as a 
respected power. For other nations, particularly in the Global South, that are 
also seeking to strengthen their rule of law regimes, the lessons from this 
 
 1* Milt and Judi Stewart Professor of Law and Director of the Stewart Center on the Global Legal 
Profession, Indiana University-Bloomington Maurer School of Law. (Jkrishna@indiana.edu). The 
author received incredibly constructive and supportive insights from Sara Dezalay, Vitor Dias, Marc 
Galanter, Charles Geyh, Ethan Michelson, Christiana Ochoa, Austen Parrish, and Lauren Robel. 
Adebola Adesanya provided invaluable research support. Finally, great appreciation is given to all the 
respondents in Nigeria who educated the author on the state of corruption and legal affairs over the last 
many years. To comply with confidentiality requirements from Indiana University’s Institutional 
Review Board, their identities are anonymized where so requested. 
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study will be instructive in determining whether lawyers who value—and are 
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A major challenge confronting global security and democratic 
governance involves the manner in which corruption is undermining the rule 
of law. Be it bribery, embezzlement, or the general abuse of power for 
personal benefit, corruption upsets the stability of societies and contributes 
to division and inequality, particularly in the Global South, or what has been 
called the developing or “third world.” Indeed, where the rule of law in a 
society has been damaged by corruption, there are profound effects: fewer 
human rights protections, inadequate social welfare services, and a decline 
of public trust in government institutions. 
A key component in understanding how corruption affects the rule of 
law is the examination of the behavior of lawyers. As actors sworn to uphold 
and advance the law, lawyers are expected to carry out justice and promote 
fairness and equity.2 At the same time, their privileged positions expose them 
to the core enticements that fuel corruption. Studying the intersection of 
 
 2 See AUSTIN SARAT AND STUART SCHEINGOLD, CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (2006) 
[hereinafter SCHEINGOLD AND SARAT 2006]. See generally SARAT TERENCE C. HALLIDAY AND LUCIEN 
KARPIK, LAWYERS AND THE RISE OF WESTERN POLITICAL LIBERALISM: EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA 
FROM THE EIGHTEENTH TO TWENTIETH CENTURIES (1998); STUART SCHEINGOLD AND AUSTIN SARAT, 
SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: POLITICS, PROFESSIONALISM, AND CAUSE LAWYERING (2004) [hereinafter 
SCHEINGOLD AND SARAT 2004]. 
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corruption, the rule of law, and the workings of lawyers is extremely timely. 
Numerous countries in the Global South are becoming epicenters for foreign 
investment. Thus, having a local set of internationally attuned lawyers in 
these countries’ vibrant “global cities,”3 as Saskia Sassen describes them, to 
meet the opportunities (and challenges) that such foreign investors offer has 
become increasingly important. However, the corrosive, enduring presence 
of corruption in much of the Global South is diluting excitement and giving 
pause to many who were once great enthusiasts.4 Therefore, empirically 
examining the legal profession at this moment is crucial for determining how 
the rule of law can be promoted and then sustained within this complicated 
region. 
Unfortunately, conventional discourse ignores the nuances of what 
lawyers do and how they operate. Too often, lawyers are depicted as little 
more than “hired guns” who intentionally confuse, obfuscate, and 
prevaricate—eroding the rule of law and furthering corruption. 5 Influential 
scholarly literature dating back to the 1970s (and continuing to this day) has 
denounced lawyers for adversely affecting the enterprise that is the rule of 
law.6 Under this stereotype, lawyers hold no lofty ambitions regarding 
democratic preservation or the promotion of the rule of law. As evidence, 
critics point to examples where lawyers have political control or are political 
insiders, and where the result is constant infighting and endless deadlock.7 
In reality, however, this school of thought is inadequate; it diminishes 
the significance of lawyers by failing to account for their notable 
contributions, especially within the Global South. In fact, a counter-narrative 
has developed to challenge conventional wisdom.8 But this second stream of 
research has often gone to the other extreme, positioning lawyers as messiah-
like saviors of the rule of law and the democratic process. The 
misrepresentation of lawyers by both sides has led to inaccuracies being 
conveyed to policymakers, judges, scholars, the media, and the general 
public. 
 
 3 See Saskia Sassen, The Global City: Introducing a Concept, 11 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 27 (2005). 
 4 See discussion infra Sections II and III. 
 5 For two classic studies on this point, see, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration 
Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L. J. 470 (1976); Stephen 
Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L. J. 1049, 1054 (1970). More recently, see WALTER 
OLSON, SCHOOLS FOR MISRULE: LEGAL ACADEMIA AND AN OVERLAWYERD AMERICA (2011). 
 6 See, e.g., supra note 5. See also MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 270 (1994); 
JOEL HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND 
SOCIAL CHANGE (1978); JACK KATZ, POOR PEOPLE’S LAWYERS IN TRANSITION (1982); GERALD P. 
LÓPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO’S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992); 
SUSAN M. OLSON, CLIENTS AND LAWYERS: SECURING THE RIGHTS OF DISABLED PERSONS (1984). 
 7 See supra note 6. 
 8 See supra note 2. See also discussion infra Section I.B. 
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As such, this study proposes an alternative vision. By focusing on the 
country of Nigeria, an oil-rich Global South market that has the largest 
population on the African continent,9 this study offers a new approach to 
analyze the broader themes discussed thus far. To its credit, Nigeria has been 
able to remain a democracy since 1999—albeit fragilely. However, private 
sector and government officials, including the current Nigerian president 
(himself a former military ruler in the 1980s), concede that corruption is the 
country’s biggest problem, fueling massive socio-economic inequality and 
the well-known Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeast.10 Public opinion 
polls conducted by the MacArthur Foundation, Gallup, Pew Research 
Center, and even Nigeria’s own Federal Bureau of Statistics all concur.11 
Making this predicament even more seemingly intractable is that corruption 
in Nigeria has deep historical roots. It was pervasive during the country’s 
military years (1966–1979 and 1983–1999), as well as during its brief, 
previous eras of democracy (1960–1966 and 1979–1983).12 
Therefore, can lawyers help stem corruption within a society that has 
suffered from its destructive presence? If so, which lawyers in particular? 
Based on extensive field research in Nigeria,13 this study argues that there is 
 
 9 Nigeria Population, WORLDOMETER, https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/nigeria-
population/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2020). 
 10 Corruption is Nigeria’s worst problem—Buhari, PREMIUM TIMES (Jan. 12, 2017), 
https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/220324-corruption-nigerias-worst-problem-
buhari.html. 
 11 U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime, Corruption in Nigeria: Bribery: Public Experience and Response 
(2017). See also Public Opinion on Corruption in Nigeria, MACARTHUR FOUNDATION (Aug. 10, 2016), 
https://www.macfound.ORG/press/publications/public-opinion-corruption-nigeria/; Jay Loschky, Ahead 
of Poll, Few Nigerians Trust in Elections, GALLUP NEWS (Jan. 13, 2015), 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/180914/ahead-poll-few-nigerians-trust-elections.aspx; Jacob Poushter, 6 
Facts about Public Opinion in Nigeria before Election Day, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Mar. 24, 2015), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/03/24/as-nigerians-head-to-the-polls-6-facts-about-public-
opinion/. 
 12 Jayanth K. Krishnan & Kunle Ajagbe, Legal Activism in the Face of Political Challenges: The 
Nigerian Case, 42 J. LEGAL PROF. 197 (2018). 
 13 The author has spent extensive time in Nigeria dating back to 2010. In particular, during different 
portions of the summers of 2017 and 2018, the author conducted research in Lagos and Abuja, Nigeria 
under approval from Indiana University’s Institutional Review Board. Interview data with 26 different 
lawyers from the Nigerian Bar Association were gathered, particularly those in key leadership positions 
of the national association and the Section on Business Law (SBL), which will be discussed below. In 
addition, the author has spent time at the Nigerian Law School, the University of Lagos Law Faculty, and 
BAZE University (Abuja), where he met with legal scholars and adjunct professors who provided him 
scholarly perspectives and original documentations on how corruption has affected the rule of law in 
Nigeria. Also as part of his research-gathering, the author interviewed key governmental policymakers at 
the state and federal levels (numbering 12 in total), as well as key SANs—Senior Advocates of Nigeria—
who, as described in the text below are considered the most elite level of litigators within the country (10 
in total). Finally, the author was invited to present his views on the legal profession and globalization to 
the SBL on two separate occasions: at the annual conferences in 2017 and 2018. During each of these 
meetings, the author met and interviewed a combined total of 36 lawyers, mostly those who were younger 
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a small but growing group of globally aware lawyers within the country who 
see themselves as nation builders and who are aggressively resisting the 
entrenched corruption that besieges this environment. By virtue of the 
opportunities provided by globalization, this cohort is not bound to the 
parochial interests that have harmed Nigeria. Yet, these lawyers also work 
within a larger profession that is conservative and, at times, demandingly 
corrupt. Indeed, as will be discussed, the story of the Nigerian legal 
profession has long been complicated. Dating back to 1960, the year Nigeria 
gained its independence, lawyers aided and abetted—but also avoided, 
navigated, and even challenged—the practice of corruption.14 
Today, the story is equally cross-cutting. Consider a day in the life of a 
twenty first-century Nigerian lawyer.15 In the morning, the lawyer might pay 
a bribe to a government official to have a client’s needs met.16 That afternoon, 
the lawyer might search for a police officer to testify in a case and who is 
not requesting a bribe to do so.17 In the evening, the lawyer may organize a 
march demanding the resignation of judges who are being investigated for 
taking bribes to throw cases.18 Finally, late at night, the lawyer may accept a 
payout from a politician who is hoping for the bar’s support on a 
controversial legislative bill being proposed.19 
 
and comprised a growing segment of the bar that is wanting to have the Nigerian legal profession engage 
international lawyers on much more interactive terms, as described particularly in Section IV of this 
paper. 
 14 See Jayanth K. Krishnan, Academic SAILERS: The Ford Foundation and the Efforts to Shape 
Legal Education in Africa, 1957–1977, 52 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 261 (2012). Note the Nigerian Bar 
Association, as this discussion will highlight, has a long pre-independence history. For example, the first 
Nigerian lawyer to be called to the English Bar was Alexander Sapara Williams in 1879. He served as 
the NBA Chair from 1900–1915. Krishnan & Ajagbe, supra note 12, at 229–230 (discussing the pre-
independence role of the NBA). 
 15 The account is based on repeated narratives conveyed to the author during his field research in 
2017 and 2018. See supra note 13; discussion infra Section IV 
 16 Id. See also, Rafiu Ajakaye, Nigerian Court Convicts Top Lawyer in Corruption Trial, ANADOLU 
AGENCY (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/nigerian-court-convicts-top-lawyer-in-
corruption-trial/1131924 (a recent, prominent corruption case). 
 17 See supra note 13; discussion infra Section IV. See also, Nigeria: Corruption Fueling Police 
Abuses, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Aug. 17, 2010), https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/08/17/nigeria-
corruption-fueling-police-abuses. 
 18 See supra note 13; discussion infra Section IV. See also, Oladimeji Ramon, Trouble with Nigerian 
Justice System—Lawyers, Judges, PUNCH (July 6, 2017), https://punchng.com/trouble-with-nigerian-
justice-system-lawyers-judges/; Gbenro Adeoye, Nigerian Bar Association Leaders Know All Corrupt 
Judges, Lawyers in Nigeria—Falana, SAHARA REPORTERS (Oct. 22, 2016), 
http://saharareporters.com/2016/10/22/nigerian-bar-association-leaders-know-all-corrupt-judges-
lawyers-nigeria-%E2%80%93falana; Samson Folarin, Falana Laments Corruption in Judiciary, Seeks 
Reform, PUNCH (Apr. 17, 2019), https://punchng.com/falana-laments-corruption-in-judiciary-seeks-
reform/. 
 19 See discussion infra Section IV. See also, Rick Messick, The Lawyers’ Role in Perpetuating 
Corruption in Nigeria, Gʟᴏʙᴀʟ Aɴᴛɪ-Cᴏʀʀᴜᴘᴛɪᴏɴ Bʟᴏɢ (Dec. 7, 2016), 
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These types of practices in Nigeria are not uncommon. Most of the 
approximately 100,000 lawyers in the country wear multiple hats and engage 
in particular courses of action depending upon the circumstances in which 
they find themselves.20 In certain situations, where the bribe resembles what 
might be seen as petty “tollbooth corruption”—or the need to make an extra 
(albeit nominal) payment to have a minor service completed—the lawyer, in 
this case, is an enabler.21 Where lawyers are the bribe-receivers, they can be 
viewed as affirmative participants in the culture of corruption. However, 
where the lawyer’s reputation is at stake, or where there is a rule of law issue 
in which the lawyer passionately believes, there may be hesitation or even 
disruptive protest towards the corruptive practice. The main point here is that 
Nigerian lawyers can be, and have been, at the forefront of promoting rule 
of law reform, while also being impediments to it.22 
The question then becomes whether the subset of lawyers—who are 
locally situated but globally experienced and who publicly advocate for an 
end to corruption at all levels of society—are able to hold firm to their 
principles and make a difference. As the story below documents, this cohort 
tends to share the following set of characteristics that connect them to the 
global marketplace: (1) they have some type of foreign education or have 
been exposed to best practices by their global legal counterparts; (2) they 
practice high-end corporate law that requires them to work in multiple 
foreign jurisdictions; (3) they are aggressive in advocating for foreign 
investment in Nigeria; and (4) they see themselves as an “elite battalion” 
who are determined to stamp-out corruption in order to raise Nigeria’s 
international profile. 
With their relative wealth and success, this elite cadre possesses 
significant social and political capital. Yet, to what extent can they actually 
disrupt the entrenched status quo? What strategies do they employ; what 
constraints do they face? How have their efforts been received? And what 
impact have they had on promoting a rule of law culture in Nigeria? 
 
https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2016/12/07/the-lawyers-role-in-perpetuating-corruption-in-
nigeria/; Adeoye, supra note 18. 
 20 The number of lawyers in Nigeria cannot be confidently ascertained. During the author’s 
fieldwork, he heard multiple figures being used—ranging from 60,000 to 120,000. Respected observers 
believe that the number is likely around 100,000, although a report from less than a decade ago notes that 
since 1962 not even 70,000 lawyers had been trained. See Since 1962, Law School Has Not Trained Up 
to 70,000 Lawyers, THE NIGERIAN VOICE (June 17, 2000), 
https://www.thenigerianvoice.com/news/27276/since-1962-law-school-has-not-trained-up-to-70-000-
lawyers.html. Furthermore, there is a question as to how many of the 100,000 actually practice. Figures 
that were given by experts during the field research suggest only about 60%–70% are practitioners. See 
supra note 13; discussion infra Section IV. 
 21 See Irina Slinko et al., Laws for Sale: Evidence from Russia, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 284 (2005). 
 22 This is the thesis of the paper, which will be explored in the sections below. 
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The answers to these questions are critical, because they help to unlock 
an enduring puzzle as to which agents are best situated to lead a country out 
of its mired, corrupt history and onto the global stage as a respected power. 
For other nations, particularly in the Global South, that are also seeking to 
strengthen their rule of law regimes, the lessons from this study are 
instructive in determining whether lawyers who value and are part of global 
networks are capable of curbing corruption within their own domestic 
contexts. 
 
*         *                 * 
 
This study will proceed in the following manner. Section I will place 
the story of lawyers as enablers, navigators, and disrupters within a 
theoretical framework that draws on three particular literatures. Namely, 
there will be a review of the scholarship that has been done, respectively, on 
corruption, “cause lawyering,” and what is known as elite theory. Section II 
then provides an overview of the Nigerian legal profession as it stands today. 
Subsequently, Section III focuses on a subset of Nigerian lawyers who 
embody a relatively new cohort of professionals who are actively engaging 
the global landscape. This segment of the bar has espoused transparency, 
good governance, and the rule of law as the guiding principles that are 
necessary to steer Nigeria away from its infamous legacy of corruption. The 
discussion here specifically focuses on what this elite group has done to try 
and change the direction of how both the legal profession and the country as 
a whole operate. To conclude, Section IV, provides a brief normative 
assessment of this development and what might be expected in the years 
ahead. 
I. THEORETICAL FRAMING OF THE STUDY 
A. The Corruption Literature and a Cynical View of Lawyers 
A vast amount of writings have detailed how corruption at the macro, 
micro, and meso levels affects the state of a country’s well-being.23 In terms 
 
 23 See, e.g., Xizi Liu, A Literature Review on the Definition of Corruption and Factors Affecting the 
Risk of Corruption, 4 OPEN J. SOC. SCI. 171, 173 (2016) (noting that “[t]he meso factors that influence 
the risk of corruption mainly emphasize the influence of the internal system construction on corruption.”). 
For a well-known, detailed literature review, see Arne Disch et al., Anti-Corruption Approaches: A 
Literature Review, NORWEGIAN AGENCY FOR DEVELOPMENT, 
https://www.sida.se/contentassets/3f5c8afd51a6414d9f6c8f8425fb935b/anti-corruption-approaches-a-
literature-review_3153.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2020). Of course, many major international donor 
agencies have made the study of (and fight against) corruption as part of their central mission. See, e.g., 
Combating Corruption, THE WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-
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of Nigeria itself, the country has been a focal point of scholars and other 
observers who study corruption. Chatham House, a policy think-tank based 
in London, released a report in 2017 showing how corruption contributed to 
Nigeria losing over a half-a-trillion dollars between 1960 and 2014.24 Daniel 
Jordan Smith’s powerful, and still highly relevant, study addresses how 
corruption is part-and-parcel of everyday life in Nigeria.25 As Smith explains, 
ordinary citizens actively and passively participate in corruption; but they 
are painfully frustrated by it, yet are also resigned to its omnipresence.26 
There are then the numerous studies that Daniel Agbiboa has produced on 
the prevalence of corruption by state actors and their civil society 
counterparts. He documents the dire effect corruption is having on Nigeria’s 
security, economy, political structure, and overall culture.27 The list of works 
on the harmful consequences of corruption in Nigeria is extensive.28 
With respect to the role played by the legal profession, in particular, the 
theory here is straightforward. In societies like Nigeria, which lack a strong 
rule of law history, often it is the lawyers who have perpetuated this climate.29 
Lawyers are the ones with the training, technical skill-set, and legal 
 
corruption (last visited Mar. 13, 2020); Peeling back the many layers of corruption, IMF ANN. REP. 
(2018), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ar/2018/eng/spotlight/reducing-corruption/ (last visited 
Mar. 13, 2020). Transparency International, which has as its primary objective to provide a “voice to the 
victims and witnesses of corruption . . .  [and by] work[ing] together with governments, businesses and 
citizens to stop the abuse of power, bribery and secret deals.” What is Transparency International, 
TRANSPARENCY INT’L, https://www.transparency.org/about (last visited Mar. 13, 2020). 
 24 See Leena Koni Hoffmann & Raj Navanit Patel, Collective Action on Corruption in Nigeria: A 
Social Norms Approach to Connecting Society and Institutions, CHATHAM HOUSE REP. iv (2017), 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2017-05-17-corruption-nigeria-
hoffmann-patel-final.pdf. 
 25 See DANIEL JORDAN SMITH, A CULTURE OF CORRUPTION EVERYDAY DECEPTION AND POPULAR 
DISCONTENT IN NIGERIA 263 (2007). 
 26 Id. 
 27 See, e.g, Daniel E. Agbiboa, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: The Political Culture of 
Corruption and Cleanups in Nigeria, 8 CEU POL. SCI. J. 273 (2013); Daniel E. Agbiboa, Corruption and 
Economic Crime in Nigeria, 22 AFR. SEC. REV. 47 (2013); Daniel E. Agbiboa, Serving the Few, Starving 
the Many: How Corruption Underdevelops Nigeria and How There Is an Alternative Perspective to 
Corruption Cleanups, 58 AFR. TODAY 111 (2012); Daniel E. Agbiboa, Between Corruption and 
Development: The Political Economy of State Robbery in Nigeria, 108 J. BUS. ETHICS, 325 (2011). 
 28 In September of 2018, Professor Matthew Stephenson of the Harvard Law School posted a 
detailed, 584-page bibliography on corruption and anti-corruption, with much of this literature featuring 
Nigeria as part of the directory. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Bibliography on Corruption and 
Anticorruption (Sept. 2018), 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/mstephenson/2018PDFs/Stephenson%20Corruption%20Bibliograp
hy%20Sept%2012%202018.pdf. 
 29 See OKECHUKWU OKO, PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES FOR LAWYERS IN AFRICA: LESSONS FROM 
NIGERIA 217–51 (2007) [hereinafter Oko, PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES]; Okechukwu Oko, 
Consolidating Democracy on a Troubled Continent: A Challenge for Lawyers in Africa, 33 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 573 (2000) [hereinafter Oko, Consolidating Democracy]. 
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knowledge to put into place regulations, statutes, and even constitutions that 
allow for themselves and those they represent to benefit at the expense of the 
rest of the public.30 Lawyers are also the ones who manipulate and use their 
fluency in legalese to obfuscate facts and to give legitimacy to practices that 
pervert justice at the local, state, and national levels. In sum, according to 
this perspective, lawyers in Nigeria have been pivotal figures who have 
significantly contributed to instability and the lack of prolonged democracy 
in the post-colonial period.31 
B. Relevant Cause Lawyering and Elite Theory Literatures 
Whereas the above literature showcases lawyers in society working as 
active participants in the corruption enterprise, scholarship from two other 
areas takes a different approach, both of which have more normatively 
positive assessments. Austin Sarat and the late Stuart Scheingold were 
trailblazers within what has become known as the “cause lawyering” 
literature.32 Sarat and Scheingold rejected how the legal profession was being 
negatively portrayed. For them, lawyers were not homogenous; instead, they 
were layered, diverse actors who had varied goals, interests, and motivations. 
And within the bar, there was a salient group of cause lawyers who saw their 
work as an embodiment of doing something more than representing clients 
on discrete legal matters.33 For these professionals, achieving financial 
success was an afterthought. Rather, their main ambition was to combat what 
they viewed as corruptive influences on their environment. To achieve this 
objective, they used their legal skills to promote morality, good governance, 
and the rule of law.34 
Of course, as part of their analysis, Sarat and Scheingold recognized 
that within the cause lawyering cohort, there was diversity of thought.35 Such 
lawyers could advocate on behalf of conservative, moderate, or liberal 
causes, and part of their strategy was to meld law together with politics in 
 
 30 See supra note 29. For another study confirming this point regarding the judiciary, see Peter 
Chukwuma Obutte, Corruption, Administration of Justice and the Judiciary in Nigeria, SSRN 1–2 (Feb. 
3, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2727319. 
 31 See Oko, PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES, supra note 29; Oko, Consolidating Democracy, supra 
note 29; Obutte, supra note 30. 
 32 See supra note 2; AUSTIN SARAT & STUART SCHEINGOLD, CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL 
COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES (1998). 
 33 See supra note 32; see also MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND 
THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994). 
 34 See supra note 32. For a review of the cause-lawyering literature, see Jayanth K. Krishnan, 
Lawyering for a Cause and Experiences from Abroad, 94 CAL. L. REV. 575 (2006). 
 35 See SCHEINGOLD AND SARAT 2004, supra note 2, at 2–9. 
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order to pursue a specific end.36 Additionally, those with a cause lawyering 
mentality routinely encountered challenges—whether it be during law 
school,37 within the profession itself,38 within their employment settings,39 or 
within the political arena.40 Yet, cause lawyers were united by a higher 
calling: to stand up against the corrosive forces imperiling progress on 
important political goals that had larger macro benefits for society writ-
large.41 
This vision of cause lawyers being able to effectuate change traces its 
roots to another theoretical framework. “Elite theory” has long argued that 
societies have within them sets of powerful individuals who play prominent 
roles in determining the direction of governmental policies.42 While there can 
be competition among different elite cohorts, along with the fact that elite 
groups can rotate in terms of their positions of influence, the premise of this 
theory is that those players who exert the strongest, most effective form of 
force on state decision-makers will ultimately see their policy preferences 
put into place.43 And lawyers can be one such elite bloc with this ability to 
impose their will. 
What this study aims to show, however, is that viewing lawyers only 
through the elite theory lens is incomplete. Similarly, seeing them solely as 
 
 36 Id. See also Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the Reproduction of 
Professional Authority: An Introduction, in CAUSE LAWYERING (AUSTIN SARAT & STUART SCHEINGOLD 
eds., 1998). 
 37 See SCHEINGOLD AND SARAT 2004, supra note 2, at 51–72. 
 38 Id. at 23–51. 
 39 Id. at 72–98. See also Stuart Scheingold & Anne Bloom, Transgressive Cause Lawyering: Practice 
Sites and the Politicization of the Professional, 5 INT’L LEGAL PROF. 209 (1998). 
 40 See SCHEINGOLD & SARAT 2004, supra note 2, at 98–124. See also Krishnan, supra note 34, at 
584–88. 
 41 See supra note 40. 
 42 A vast literature in the social sciences has discussed elite theory for decades. For a summary of 
this school of thought, see Jayanth K. Krishnan et al., Legal Elites and the Shaping of Corporate Law 
Practice in Brazil: A Historical Study, 41 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 346, 348–49 (2016) (citing FLOYD HUNTER, 
COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURE: A STUDY OF DECISION MAKERS (1953); ELMER E. 
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW OF 
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1960); ROBERT D. PUTNAM, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH THE COMPARATIVE 
STUDY OF POLITICAL ELITES (1976); CHARLES WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE (1956)). 
 43 For a discussion of this point, see ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL 
STUDY OF THE OLIGARCHICAL TENDENCIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY (1962); GAETANO MOSCA, THE 
RULING CLASS (1966); VILFREDO PARETO, THE MIND AND SOCIETY: A TREATISE ON GENERAL 
SOCIOLOGY (1963); C.R. Kaltwasser, Toward Post-Neo Liberalism in Latin America, 46 LATIN AM. RES. 
REV. 225 (2011). For two contemporary scholars who have written about how elites can bring to the table 
key expertise, networks, and knowledge, see YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH, THE INTERNALIZATION 
OF PALACE WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN 
STATES 49 (2002) (discussing how the most effective elites combine their “know-who with [a keen sense 
of] . . . know-how.”); YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH, ASIAN LEGAL REVIVALS: LAWYERS IN 
SHADOW OF EMPIRE (2010). 
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valiant cause lawyering champions also is insufficient, as is cynically 
categorizing them as exclusive agents of corruption. Rather, a more nuanced 
approach is required. The Nigerian case study provides an opportunity to 
highlight how lawyers can simultaneously engage in facilitating, navigating, 
and denouncing corruption as part of everyday business. Each of these ways 
of operating as a lawyer is what makes understanding the country’s legal 
profession complicated—but also realistic. 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE NIGERIAN BAR 
A. Support for the Cynical Theory on Nigerian Lawyers  
As the most populated country in Africa, with approximately 200 
million people, Nigeria is nevertheless extremely underpopulated when it 
comes to lawyers. Moreover, the distribution of where these lawyers are 
located is uneven. There are 36 states in Nigeria, with the vast majority 
working within the country’s major metropolitan cities: Lagos, Kano, 
Ibadan, Abuja, Port Harcourt, and Benin City.44 Yet, nearly two-thirds of the 
country’s populace resides in rural areas,45 where the presence of lawyers is 
sparse, if not non-existent.46 Furthermore, most lawyers in Nigeria (upwards 
of 90%) work as solo-practicing litigators, regardless of whether they are in 
rural or urban Nigeria. According to a high-ranking official of the Nigeria 
Bar Association (NBA), most lawyers “remain poor,”47 earning on average 
only about the equivalent of $150 (USD) per month well below the per capita 
GDP of the country, which is approximately $5,300 (USD) annually.48 
Given this economic situation, it is not surprising that many Nigerian 
lawyers fall prey to enticements of corruption at the individual, micro level. 
At the more macro level, it is also not difficult to see how the bar, in its 
institutional capacity, would be susceptible. The birth of the NBA dates back 
to colonial times, with the passage of the 1933 British-backed Legal 
Practitioners Ordinance.49 As the British had done in managing many of its 
 
 44 The demographics of where the largest number of lawyers are situated comes from author 
interviews with three bar association officials, in Abuja, Nigeria (June 30, 2018). 
 45 See Holly E. Reed and Blessing U. Mberu, Capitalizing on Nigeria’s Demographic Dividend: 
Reaping the Benefits and Diminishing the Burdens, 27 AFR. POPULATION STUD. 319, 321 (2013) (citing 
a study from the Nigerian Population Commission and ICF Macro). 
 46 See author interview of three bar association officials, in Abuja, Nigeria (June 30, 2018). 
 47 See Kunle Awosiyan, Why Many Nigerian Lawyers Are Poor, SILVER BIRD TV, 
http://silverbirdtv.com/uncategorized/34794/why-many-nigerian-lawyers-are-poor/ (last visited Mar. 11, 
2020) (citing the then chairman of the NBA’s Lagos Branch Law Week Committee, Ahmed Akbani, who 
was making the point that because Nigerian lawyers are not business savvy, they struggle financially). 
 48 See Nigeria GDP Per Capita PPP, TRADING ECON., https://tradingeconomics.com/nigeria/gdp-
per-capita-ppp (last visited Mar. 10, 2020). 
 49 See Krishnan & Ajagbe, supra note 12, at 229–30. 
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colonies around the world, it used a formula that it saw as essential to retain 
power. Namely, it would grant accommodations to certain interests and then 
move to co-opt those who had received such Royal benefits, in order to breed 
loyalty and keep the local population from unifying against the Crown.50 In 
terms of the NBA, the British legalized and legitimized this organization—
many of whose members were educated and trained in the United Kingdom 
(U.K.)—as a means of establishing a strong local ally.51 In fact, as one current 
member of the NBA remarked, lawyers in the colonial era were perceived to 
be in the “hip pocket”52 of the British and were skeptically viewed by the 
general public. 
In the post-colonial period, this perception of the NBA being involved 
in various nefarious activities has continued. There are specific examples 
highlighting how the NBA helped the different military regimes maintain 
their power. For instance, during the brutal reign of General Sani Abacha 
(1993–1998), the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) was 
established.53 This agency today has gained respect and legitimacy, but at the 
time it was created, it was viewed by many grassroots activists as a farcical 
effort by the government to appear as if it was concerned with human rights. 
Yet, many within the NBA supported this Abacha-initiative in the 1990s.54 
For skeptics, this endorsement had all the trappings of an interest group that 
was looking to curry favor with the ruling elite for the purposes of gaining 
benefits at the rest of the public’s expense.  
Another instance during the Abacha regime that caused observers to 
question the integrity and moral standing of NBA-lawyers involved the 
prosecution of the famed environmental advocate, Ken Saro-Wiwa, 
beginning in 1994. Saro-Wiwa had been a fierce defender of the Ogoni 
 
 50 For a classic book on this topic, see generally TOYIN FALOLA, COLONIALISM AND VIOLENCE IN 
NIGERIA (2009). 
 51 Interview with key Senior Advocate of Nigeria (June 27, 2018). For a thoughtful discussion of the 
history of the bar during colonial times, see T.O. Elias, Organisation and Development of the Legal 
Profession in Africa, in Particular the Ability of the Bar and Judiciary to Uphold the Rights of Both the 
Citizen and the State, THE DENNING L. J. 49 (1986). For general background on the history of the bar, see 
OKO, PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES, supra note 29; OKO, Consolidating Democracy, supra note 29; 
Okechukwu Oko, Lawyers in Fragile Democracies and the Challenges of Democratic Consolidation: the 
Nigerian Experience, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1295 (2009) [hereinafter The Nigerian Experience]. 
 52 Interview with NBA official, in Abuja, Nigeria (June 29, 2018). 
 53 See generally O.C. OKAFOR, LEGITIMIZING HUMAN RIGHTS NGOS: LESSONS FROM NIGERIA 183 
(2006); OKO, PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES, supra note 29, at 227. See also NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
COMMISSION, http://www.nigeriarights.gov.ng/index.php (last visited Mar. 11, 2020); Krishnan & 
Ajagbe, supra note 12, at 221. 
 54 See OKAFOR, supra note 53 (noting how a civil society organization, known as the Civil Liberties 
Organization—whose lawyers were also members of the NBA—also played a pivotal role in backing the 
establishment of the NHRC). 
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people who resided in the Niger Delta region.55 He and his allies had claimed 
that the Nigerian government and the Shell Corporation, which had a 
dominating presence in the area, had exploited the Delta’s resources and 
engaged in systematic discrimination and displacement of the Ogoni.56 The 
arrest, trial, conviction, and eventual execution of Saro-Wiwa and eight of 
his colleagues resulted in global condemnation and has been written at length 
elsewhere.57 For our purposes, it was appalling that a group of private 
lawyers from the NBA agreed to assist the Abacha government in the 
prosecution of Saro-Wiwa and his fellow defendants.58 That professionals 
who were supposed to be defenders of the rule of law were intentionally 
subverting it, smacked of craven instrumentalism and corruption. 
Others too have been critical of the bar during this and other periods.59 
Okechukwu Oko is one of the most well-known legal scholars on Nigeria 
who has described how lawyers have misused their positions,60 whether it be 
through procuring questionable pecuniary benefits, failing to uphold their 
professional responsibilities, or more generally, thinking about themselves 
over the greater societal good.61 In fact, even the manner in which Nigerian 
lawyers have been educated and trained has been deeply problematic, as 
corrupt practices are often encouraged within many of these academic 
institutions.62 Oko has long contended that in order for Nigeria’s democratic 
experiment to be consolidated, the country needs to have a legal profession 
that is stable, predictable, and legitimate—and one that is publicly perceived 
to have these characteristics as well.63 
 
 55 See Krishnan & Ajabge, supra note 12, at 217–21. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. See also Jad Mouawad, Shell to Pay $15.5 Million to Settle Nigerian Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 
8, 2009; OKAFOR, supra note 53, at 40, 102, 179; TOYIN FALOLA & MATTHEW M. HEATON, A HISTORY 
OF NIGERIA xxxi, 231–32, 239 (2008); ROY DORON & TOYIN FALOLA, KEN SARO-WIWA 79–98, 126 
(2016); OKO, PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES, supra note 29, at 230–39. 
 58 The lead prosecutor was a prominent private practitioner, J.B. Daudu, who later went on to become 
a Senior Advocate of Nigeria and the head of the NBA from 2010–2012. See Mustapha Ogunsakin, 
Famous Case: The Trial and Murder of Ken Saro-Wiwa, THE GAVEL (Nov. 15, 2015). 
 59 Note, with permission of the publisher, this paragraph excerpts and draws from a detailed 
discussion of Oko’s many works in Krishnan & Ajagbe, supra note 12, at 197. See generally OKO, 
PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES, supra note 29; Oko, Consolidating Democracy, supra note 29. 
 60 See Krishnan & Ajagbe, supra note 12, at 197. See generally OKO, PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES, 
supra note 29; Oko, Consolidating Democracy, supra note 29. 
 61 See generally supra note 29. For another study confirming this point regarding the judiciary, see 
Obutte, supra note 30. See also Okechukwu Oko, Contemporary Law Practice in Nigeria, 38 J. AFR. L. 
104 (1994). 
 62 See generally OKO, PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES, supra note 29, at 97–143. 
 63 Id. at 264. See also Oko, The Nigerian Experience, supra note 51, at 1318 (arguing that lawyers 
should be stronger at “promoting accountability, strengthening public institutions, recapturing the sense 
of public good, rejuvenating the civil society, and helping to improve security.”); Okechukwu Oko, The 
Problems and Challenges of Lawyering in Developing Societies, 35 RUTGERS L. J. 569, 642 (2004). 
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Then there is the noted human rights activist, Femi Falana, who has 
chastised the NBA for brazenly participating in corruption.64 For example, in 
2016, the government’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission found 
that certain senior lawyers had been complicit in cases of money laundering 
for years.65 And in 2017, a federal court voided the election win of the current 
president of the NBA, A.B. Mahmoud.66 The court ruled that the NBA 
constitution, upon which Mahmoud’s victory was premised, had been 
amended in an improper fashion to give him an unfair advantage.67 
Perhaps the harshest criticism, however, has come from a confidential 
report on the “secretariat” of the NBA, which was leaked to the press in 
2013.68 The secretariat is the bureaucratic arm of the NBA that originally 
handled only “minor administrative and logistical issues . . . [whereas today 
it oversees] programming responsibilities, requiring the full attention of a 
professional cadre . . . .” 69 In 2012, the president of the NBA constituted an 
external committee to review the secretariat, which had developed the 
reputation for lethargy and incompetence.70 Chaired by Chidi Odinkalu,71 the 
committee’s final report not only confirmed these negative images, but it 
also offered another damning conclusion. It found “a clear pattern of credibly 
 
 64  See Femi Falana Blasts Nigerian Bar Association, EASTWIND NEWSPAPER (Oct. 10, 2016), 
https://eastwindnewz.wordpress.com/2016/10/10/femi-falana-blasts-nigeria-bar-association/; Omatayo 
Yusuf, Fema Falana Blasts NBA for Shielding Corruption, LEGIT (Oct 10, 2016), 
https://www.naij.com/1001312-femi-falana-supports-arrest-corrupt-judges-blasts-nba-promoting-
corruption.html. 
 65 EFCC Tackles NBA President; Says Nigerian Bar Populated by ‘Rogues and Vultures’, PREMIUM 
TIMES (Aug. 27, 2016), http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/209409-efcc-tackles-nba-
president-says-nigerian-bar-populated-rogues-vultures.html. See also Aminu Gamawa, The Fight 
Against Anti-Corruption Agencies by NBA, FACEBOOK (Sept. 16, 2016), 
https://www.facebook.com/aminugamawa/posts/1112314568852875:0. See also Matthew Page, A New 
Taxonomy for Corruption in Nigeria, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (July 17, 2018), 
https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/07/17/new-taxonomy-for-corruption-in-nigeria-pub-76811; John 
Campbell, Nigeria Sees More High Level Corruption Convictions under Buhari, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS (May 31, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/blog/nigeria-sees-more-high-level-corruption-
convictions-under-buhari. 
 66 Court Voids 2015 NBA Constitution, Sacks Mahmoud as President, THE CABLE (Mar. 31, 2017), 
https://www.thecable.ng/court-voids-2015-nba-constitution-sacks-mahmoud-president. As one of the 
interviewed respondents stated in a written correspondence with the author, Mahmoud “naturally 
appealed and got a stay. He saw out his tenure and the appeal is still moving at a glacial pace—[in that it 
is] still unheard. By the time it is eventually heard, it will have become quite an academic question and 
whose life force has been long extinguished!” Author correspondence with respondent (July 28, 2019). 
 67 Id. 
 68 See Jayanth & Ajagbe, supra note 12. 
 69 See Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) Committee on Professionalization of the NBA Secretariat, 
NBA SECRETARIAT COMM. (Jan. 2013), https://www.premiumtimesng.com/wp-
content/files/2013/06/NBA-Secretariat-Prof-Cmmttee-.pdf. 
 70  Id. 
 71  Id. at 10. 
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attested allegations of work-place bullying, abuse and sexual harassment, 
intimidation and exploitation, with no mechanisms of workplace 
recourse”72—all undergirded by a dominant, pervasive culture of corruption. 
The above discussion thus supports the theory that powerful segments 
of the Nigerian bar have not been shy to help facilitate corruptive practices 
during both the military and post-military eras.73 As the research has shown, 
many lawyers, over the years, have engaged in or been the beneficiaries of 
corruption.74 And this behavior has led to a serious undermining of the rule 
of law. 
B. Support for the Theory of Nigerian Lawyers as Cause Lawyering 
Elites 
An alternative narrative to the one just discussed—with supportive 
counter-evidence—is that the Nigerian bar has been on the right side of the 
thorny legal, political, and moral issues confronting the country in the post-
colonial era. Consider the above-mentioned Saro-Wiwa case. While it was 
true that a team of NBA lawyers served as prosecutors on behalf of the 
government, there was also a highly reputed team of NBA-defense lawyers 
across the aisle. These lawyers worked pro bono and joined forces with civil 
society organizations in mounting a strong defense for Saro-Wiwa and his 
colleagues.75 
As part of their work, the defense lawyers had to operate within the 
predetermined, corrupt Abacha-Tribunals, but they navigated these forums 
thoughtfully and vigorously, and they even had the courage to boycott the 
proceedings (upon Saro-Wiwa’s urging and in defiance of the government’s 
orders), after ultimately concluding that there was no point in participating 
in such a sham process.76 However, while they were engaged in the trial, the 
defense team brought worldwide attention to their case and even took the 
matter to the continent’s African Commission on Human and People’s 
Rights, which ruled in their favor.77 (Not surprisingly, General Abacha 
 
 72  Id. at 6. 
 73 The periods of military rule in Nigeria were from 1966–1979 and 1983–1999. 
 74 See Krishnan & Ajagbe, supra note 12; Oko, PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES, supra note 29; Oko, 
Consolidating Democracy, supra note 29; Oko, The Nigerian Experience, supra note 51. 
 75 See Krishnan & Ajagbe, supra note 12, at 218 (noting that the groups included “International Pen, 
the Constitutional Rights Project, Interights, and the CLO [Civil Liberties Organization].”). See also 
International Pen, Constitutional Rights Project, Interights on behalf of Ken Saro-Wiwa Jr. 
and Civil Liberties Organization v. Nigeria, 137/94, 139/94, 154/96 and 161/97, AFRICAN COMMISSION 
ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS (Oct. 31, 1998), 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b6123.html. 
 76 See Howard W. French, Nigeria Executes Critic of Regime; Nations Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
11, 1995, at p.1. 
 77 Id. See Krishnan & Ajagbe, supra note 12, at 218. 
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ignored the Commission’s judgment, even though Nigeria was a signatory 
to the convention that brought the Commission into existence. 78) After the 
case ended and Saro-Wiwa and his colleagues were executed, these lawyers 
continued to press for justice. Working with a group of American lawyers, 
in 2009 they were able to reach a settlement with the Shell Corporation, in 
which the latter agreed to pay over $15 million to Saro-Wiwa’s family and 
the other defendants for what they had endured under Abacha’s reign of 
terror.79 
There are also other examples of Nigerian lawyers showing this type of 
commitment to the rule of law and to causes greater than themselves. To 
begin, it was the NBA “that admirably served as a vital piece of the struggle 
for independence,”80 which eventually occurred in 1960. Then, the 1963 
Constitution of Nigeria, which was seen as a hallmark of rights protection, 
federalism, separation of powers, and good governance, was drafted by 
leading lawyers of the NBA. Even though this document remained in place 
for just three years (because of a military coup that occurred in 1966), it has 
remained the reference point to which lawyers in Nigeria have turned as they 
have drafted subsequent constitutions.81 
Also, during the first period of military rule (1966–1979), civil society 
organizations, working together with lawyers from the NBA, successfully 
lobbied the regime to pass the Legal Aid Act of 1976, which established the 
Legal Aid Council (LAC).82 The purpose of the statute and the Council was 
to ensure that indigent criminal defendants received legal assistance from the 
state, and it was the NBA that served as the main group that represented these 
individuals. To be sure, it was often difficult to find lawyers willing to work 
for a poorly funded government agency that always had the military 
 
 78 See Krishnan & Ajagbe, supra note 12, at 216; French, supra note 76. 
 79 See Mouawad, supra note 56. 
 80 See Oko, Consolidating Democracy, supra note 29, at 635–36. 
 81 See Krishnan & Ajagbe, supra note 12, at 203; Ayoyinka Jegede, Nigeria Has to Adopt the 1963 
Constitution, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 22, 2016), https://guardian.ng/features/nigeria-has-to-adopt-1963-
constitution/. Note, as a prominent member of the Nigerian legal profession stated, however, it is 
important to remember that the “1979 Constitution which was drafted under the chairmanship of Nigeria’s 
greatest lawyer, Chief Rotimi Williams, SAN . . . [also] remains the reference and inspiration for all 
subsequent iterations. As a matter of fact, the extant 1999 Constitution is, in the main, a verbatim 
replication of that of 1979.” Author correspondence with respondent (July 28, 2019). 
 82 See Krishnan & Ajagbe, supra note 12, at 206 (citing Ojama Akor, Developing Legal Aid 
Strategies for Poor Nigerians, PRESSREADER.COM (Aug. 19, 2004), 
https://www.pressreader.com/nigeria/daily-trust/20140819/282325383136021). For more on the history 
of LAC, see Historical Profile of the Legal Aid Council of Nigeria, LEGAL AID COUNCIL (May 22, 2017), 
http://www.legalaidcouncil.gov.ng/index.php/about-us/profile; PENAL REFORM INTERNATIONAL AND 
BLUHM LEGAL CLINIC OF NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, ACCESS-TO-JUSTICE IN 
AFRICA AND BEYOND: MAKING THE RULE OF LAW A REALITY 117 (2007). 
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overseeing how it functioned.83 Yet, the program had success stories, as the 
efforts of the NBA did reap benefits for some especially needy defendants.84 
The country’s second period of military rule (1983–1999) also saw 
careful lawyering by elite professionals who navigated the tumultuous 
political waters in order to meet the challenges of the times. For example, 
the well-regarded Civil Liberties Organization (CLO) was established in 
1987. It, together with a set of NBA-lawyers, strategically worked to 
convince the ruling military regime into “updat[ing] the 1976 Legal Aid 
Act.”85 Additionally, during this time, a CLO-led coalition of grassroots 
lawyers successfully litigated several other high profile matters in front of 
the African Commission.86 And other organizations had NBA lawyers within 
them who worked quietly and tactically with international institutions in 
order to procure funding so that they could continue their work championing 
the different constituencies who were suffering under the military.87 
As Nigeria moved towards civilian, democratic rule beginning in 1999, 
lawyers were once again at the forefront of this transition. The drafting of 
the new constitution that was enacted in May of that year involved a team of 
lawyers and was led by Justice Niki Tobi, who was then a judge on the 
Nigerian Court of Appeal.88 Justice Tobi headed the Constitution Debate 
 
 83 See Krishnan & Ajagbe, supra note 12, at 206–07 (citing OKO, PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES, 
supra note 29, at 207; David McQuoid-Mason, Legal Aid in Nigeria: Using National Youth Services 
Corps Public Defenders to Expand the Services of the Legal Aid Council, 47 J. AFR. L. 107, 111 (2003)). 
 84 See generally Krishnan & Ajagbe, supra note 12. 
 85 See id. at 215. See, e.g, OKAFOR, supra note 53, at 8; S.A. Agbakwa & O.C. Okafor, Social Action 
Litigation and Access-to-Justice in Nigeria: A Critical Case Study, in JUSTICE FOR THE POOR: 
PERSPECTIVES ON ACCELERATING ACCESS (A. Dias & G. H. Welch eds., 2009). Indeed, Okafor has 
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leaders who privileged their own personal ambitions over the rank-and-file. See OKAFOR, supra note 53, 
at 77–150; Chidi A. Odinkalu, Why More Africans Don’t Use Human Rights Language, HUMAN RIGHTS 
DIALOGUE 3 (2000). 
 86 See Krishnan & Ajagbe, supra note 12, at 215–17 (citing several cases, including: 
Civil Liberties Org. v. Nigeria, Comm. No. 45/90 (Afr. Comm’n Hum. and Peoples’ Rts. 1994); 
Civil Liberties Org. v. Nigeria, Comm No. 101/93 (Afr. Comm’n on Hum. & Peoples’ Rts, 1994); Civil 
Liberties Organisation, Legal Defence Centre, Legal Defence and Assistance Project v. Nigeria, Comm. 
No. 218/98 (Afr. Comm’n on Hum. and Peoples’ Rts. 1998). For other cases that are discussed and cited, 
see Chidi A. Odinkalu, The Individual Complaints Procedures of the African Commission on Human and 
People’s Rights: A Preliminary Assessment, 8 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 359, 402–03, n.95 
(1998). 
 87 See Krishnan & Ajagbe, supra note 12, at 215–17. See also OKAFOR, supra note 53, at 77–150 
(arguing that often what has happened in this solicitation of funds from foreign donors is that the domestic 
Nigerian groups become beholden to these outside interests. The result is that there is a mismatch between 
what the civil society groups are doing and what those who are suffering or in need). 
 88 See Justice Niki Tobi, Chairman, Constitutional Debate Coordinating Committee, Presentation of 
the Report of [NIGERIAN] CONSTITUTION DEBATE COORDINATING COMMITTEE (CDCC). 
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Coordinating Committee (CDCC) that worked with a group of Senior 
Advocates of Nigeria—or SANs—on this new constitution.89 Since 1975, 
SANs have held the position of what is the equivalent of a Queen’s Council 
in the U.K., and it is the highest rank one can attain among lawyers in 
Nigeria.90 
In the post-1999 era, members of the legal profession, working with 
rights-based civil society groups, have also engaged the courts through 
public interest litigation campaigns.91 In addition, lawyers have been 
involved in pushing for, and then being a part of, government-established 
truth commissions to investigate the widespread human rights abuses that 
occurred during the military years.92 They have played a prominent role in 
fighting various forms of corruption in government and within the private 
sector as well. 93 And leaders of the NBA have called for legal education 
institutions to inculcate the values of good governance, transparency, and 
anti-corruption practices into the curriculum of all students who study law 
today.94 
Clearly, this alternative story about the role of lawyers in a country like 
Nigeria paints a far different picture than the one offered by the more cynical 
perspective. Under this cause lawyering/elite model approach, most lawyers 
in Nigeria have been positive figures who have navigated the corrupt 
environment in which they reside, in order to try and bring about change for 
the better. This then leads us to ask: which narrative is correct? Which 
version is most accurate? 
The answer is that there is truth in what each of these theories purports. 
The Nigerian Bar is not a homogenous organization. Segments of it have 
indeed engaged in corrupt practices over the years; others have been ardent 
rule of law advocates seeking to strengthen and consolidate the country’s 
democratic experiment; and then there have certainly been those who have 
 
 89 Id. The CDCC has been constituted by the military regime, which had agreed to turn over power 
to civilian rule the following year. 
 90 See Daniel Bullusson, Nigeria: How to Become a Senior Advocate of Nigeria, THE DAILY TRUST 
(May 23, 2017), https://allafrica.com/stories/201705230633.html. 
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acted in both positive and negative ways—thereby highlighting the overall 
fluidity of the work-environment within the country.95 
What is noteworthy, however, is that in the early 2000s a new legal 
organization emerged that sought to embrace anti-corruption values not just 
on a macro, public law scale, but on a more day-to-day, private law level as 
well. This group has proven to be a significant legal, economic, and political 
force within the country. Its evolution, contributions, and the manner in 
which it is seeking to combat corruption within Nigeria are discussed next. 
III. THE RISE OF A NEW LEGAL CONTINGENT 
A. Background 
The Section on Business Law (SBL), a subset of the NBA, was founded 
by a group of Nigerian business lawyers in late 2004 in the city of Lagos, the 
country’s economic (and former national) capital.96 With an estimated 20 
million people residing today in this mega-metropolis, Lagos is the 
commercial hub of Nigeria, as well as for much of the African continent. 
Given this context, it is not surprising that most of Nigeria’s major financial 
matters have occurred within Lagos as well. 
The cohort of business lawyers who came together to form the SBL had 
a clear objective in mind. Given that Nigeria’s transition from military to 
civilian rule had occurred just a few years prior, the country’s political 
leaders were trying to market Nigeria as Africa’s newest, largest democracy, 
where foreign investors: a) would be welcome; b) could be confident that 
their money would be safe; and c) would not need to worry about corruption 
hampering their ability to do business.97 The group of lawyers who created 
the SBL saw this moment as an opportunity to advocate for a set of ideals 
that they believed would benefit them economically, but more importantly, 
would benefit the nation as a whole.98 
Consider the early years of the SBL and the manner in which it came 
into existence. The election of 1999 brought back to power Olusegun 
Obasanjo (who was a military ruler between 1976 and 1979) as president. 
This election was not perfect, but it was overall a success compared to what 
the country had experienced dating back to 1960.99 In the immediate 
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aftermath, one of Nigeria’s most well-known business lawyers, George 
Etomi, started working with a group of colleagues from Lagos in hopes of 
discussing ways to mobilize the commercial legal community.100 
In terms of his own background, Etomi had earned his LL.B. in 1976 
from the University of Ife and became a member of the bar a year later—
during a period of military rule.101 Subsequently, he traveled to the U.K. 
where he earned his Master’s Degree in law from the London School of 
Economics in 1979.102 Upon his return to Nigeria, the country had 
transitioned to democratic rule, and he was eager to be a part of this new 
era.103 Unfortunately, by 1983 the military once again took over and stayed 
in power for the next 16 years.104 Etomi was thus a young corporate lawyer 
who had witnessed a country that went from military rule to democracy and 
then back to military rule in a span of less than ten years. 
Throughout this entire period, however, Etomi strongly believed that 
the NBA had not paid enough heed to private law lawyers.105 In 2000, after 
democratic constitutionalism was restored, Etomi approached the newly 
elected president of the NBA, Senior Advocate of Nigeria (SAN) Chief 
O.C.J. Okocho, making the case that the bar association needed to take into 
account business law practitioners.106 Okocho agreed. Etomi was appointed 
as chair of a commission to examine how best to give voice to business 
practitioners as well as to arrive at a procedure for “amending the NBA 
constitution to allow for the creation of” a business law section.107 In 2002, 
Chief Wole Olanikpekun (SAN) became president of the NBA, and he 
continued to encourage Etomi to proceed. Thereafter, Etomi and a group of 
his colleagues worked to craft substantive ways to shift Nigeria’s global 
image from one that was seen as a corrupt banana republic to a society that 
could be viewed as economically efficient and democratically reliable.108 
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Eventually, by December of 2004, Etomi and his colleagues received 
permission from the NBA to establish the SBL. Going forward, the SBL 
would be the division of the bar in charge of “engender[ing] the professional 
development of Nigerian commercial lawyers and thereby rais[ing] the level 
of business law practice in Nigeria.”109 In addition, the constitution of the 
NBA was amended to include provisions that now recognized and valued the 
importance of transactional business lawyers. It is interesting that these 
provisions did not come into being until 2004, considering that for many 
years (including periods of military control) there were already many 
corporate law firms working on transactional matters in Lagos. By relying 
on multiple methods of data collection (because no one comprehensive 
directory existed), we were able to create a detailed listing of the firms that 
were in existence during those early years—see Appendix A.110 
As that table shows, the size of law firms in Nigeria has never been 
large, at least in global, comparative terms. Most have not had more than five 
to ten lawyers, and even today the largest firms have just around one hundred 
lawyers. Nevertheless, the fact that these lawyers, who had been working on 
private law matters within the country, now were in a position to be liaisons 
for international investors gave them a type of leverage that they did not 
previously have. Accordingly, the SBL came to be seen by the upper 
echelons of the NBA as necessary for the economic development of the 
country. The request by Etomi and his colleagues that the bar listen to their 
philosophy and plans for moving the country forward was now receiving 
more deference than ever before.111 
B. The Philosophy in the Early Years 
Underlying the establishment of the SBL was the philosophy that 
modern Nigeria had to be part of the globalized world; thus Nigeria needed 
a sophisticated business law sector where international investors felt secure 
in order to compete in the global market.112 Normatively too, the SBL 
founders believed that globalization was good for the legal system and for 
the country as well.113 Like Etomi, the other early leaders had global 
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experiences. They had studied abroad, had clients from overseas, worked 
with lawyers across multiple jurisdictions, and routinely traveled to Asia, 
Europe, and North America.114 They were also members of various 
international legal organizations and were frequent attendees or speakers at 
conferences in different countries.115 
These lawyers’ first priority was engaging their counterparts working 
in other markets. Foreign bar associations were promoting best global legal 
practices at annual meetings and during continuing legal education 
seminars.116 If the Nigerian corporate bar wanted to “keep-up,” then its 
constituents had to travel abroad to learn these skills.117 Hence, these lawyers 
saw themselves as quintessential international actors who could use the 
lessons learned from overseas to help the new Nigeria find its place in this 
evolving global market. 
The first order of business the SBL leaders felt they had to tackle was 
how to combat both the reality and the image that Nigeria was defined by 
corruption. While the former was a systemic issue requiring a long-term 
commitment by the state and civil society to correct; in terms of the latter, 
the SBL believed it could have a more immediate impact. Dating back to the 
late 1990s, the German-based Transparency International organization had 
been conducting what it called “perception”118 surveys, in order to gauge how 
business and other civic leaders perceived corruption around the world. 
Since 1995, Nigeria consistently ranked at or near the very bottom.119 Given 
that SBL-lawyers were critical players who interacted with such 
international business leaders, they felt they could directly help shape a new 
and positive narrative on investing in Nigeria. 
To that end, there were specific steps that the SBL pursued starting in 
2005, the first official year of its operation. For example, it launched an 
“Anti-Corruption [and] Money Laundering”120 initiative. The “hope . . . [was] 
that, through the forum of the SBL, lawyers and policy makers [from the 
government] would engage with each other to find ways to cooperate in the 
fight against corruption.”121 In particular, the SBL was interested in 
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reforming the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC).122 The 
EFCC was established in 2003, upon the directive of President Obasanjo, 
after a leading international organization (the French-based, Financial 
Action Task Force) found that Nigeria had been woefully failing in its efforts 
to fight corruption.123 The specific mission of the EFCC was to pursue and 
prosecute those who engaged in money laundering.124 
The SBL had complained about the practices of the EFCC because the 
agency routinely had condemned defense lawyers for being complicit in their 
clients’ misdeeds.125 For example, the first Chair of the EFCC, Mallam Nuhu 
Ribadu, would frequently decry the fact that fees that defense lawyers would 
receive from their clients were from laundered money. For the SBL, this 
position was both unfair and unsupported. As one SBL official noted, in a 
rule of law society even the most vilified defendant deserved to have a lawyer 
zealously advocate on that individual’s behalf.126 Moreover, having a 
contrary system in place would understandably scare-off foreign investors 
from coming to Nigeria, especially if they believed that, were they to be 
investigated or arrested, their lawyers too could potentially be accused.127 
Therefore, in 2005, the SBL began holding high level meetings with 
members of the EFCC so as to “provide an avenue for both parties to put 
aside any differences in orientation or practice and learn from each other.”128 
Concurrently, the SBL also began working with the Ministry of Commerce’s 
new office referred to as the Special Control Unit against Money Laundering 
(SCUML).129 This division was charged with monitoring and investigating 
the economic activities of civil society organizations, which theoretically 
included the bar as well.130 (As discussed above, because some members of 
the NBA in the past had sullied the bar’s reputation, it was not completely 
surprising that the SCUML might wish to assert oversight powers over the 
organization if need be.) As a way of ensuring that they could be involved in 
how the agency would carry out its mandate, and as a signal that they were 
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on its side in wanting to stamp-out corruption, SBL leaders took an 
affirmative role in working with the SCUML.131 
In 2006, the SBL hosted its first major conference, which brought 
together policymakers from the SCUML and EFCC, the business bar, leaders 
of the NBA, and a small group of private international observers. The theme 
was “Globalization and Legal Practice—The WTO Initiative: The 
Implication for the Future of Legal Practice in Nigeria.”132 A significant part 
of this event focused on how Nigerian lawyers needed to equip themselves 
with best practices to compete within the international trade space. More will 
be discussed on this point shortly; however, an underlying focus throughout 
the conference was “[t]he War against Corruption and Its Impact on 
Reforms.”133 Different panels on anti-corruption and money laundering were 
held, along with numerous sideline meetings between the various 
stakeholders. 
For the SBL, this inaugural conference was an enormous milestone. For 
the first time since independence, there was this type of professional 
gathering totaling some 600 attendees.134 The country’s top business lawyers 
were interacting and seeking to influence—in a thoughtful, academic 
manner—state leaders who were going to frame regulatory policy for the 
next decade.135 This was also an opportunity for the SBL to distinguish itself 
from the larger NBA. Since Etomi and his colleagues had started mobilizing 
in the early 2000s, a chasm had developed between them and the NBA-
leadership.136 The former wanted to set themselves apart; they did not want 
to be tied to what they saw as the more questionable elements within the 
larger Association.137 
Moreover, the SBL-leadership wanted to develop a new culture within 
its own cohort. Several members of the conference’s inaugural planning 
committee noted that they saw the education of the Nigerian business bar as 
a priority, particularly in this era of globalization.138 One specific aspect 
included teaching these lawyers about the ills of corruption. Therefore, the 
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pitch the SBL leaders made was two-fold. First, the facilitation and practice 
of corruption contributed to the continued image that Nigeria was a lawless 
society, one in which foreign investors would stay clear.139 Second, it was 
critical for Nigerian corporate lawyers to be familiar with the major anti-
corruption statute that global transactional lawyers were expected to know: 
the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.140 This statute prohibited 
U.S. citizens and their representatives from engaging in acts such as bribery 
and other forms of corruption in a foreign jurisdiction.141 The SBL believed 
its members needed to be fully aware of this statute and its implications, not 
just to protect its clients’ interests, but also to safeguard its own practices and 
potentially its ability to work in the U.S.142 The inaugural conference, hence, 
was the ideal setting to emphasize these anti-corruption measures. 
C. The End of the Etomi Era 
The above discussion highlighted the key activities that Etomi 
supervised during the initial years. But once the inaugural conference 
successfully concluded, he and the rest of the SBL-leadership began thinking 
about their longer-term strategy. They developed a multi-year plan that 
would take them through the end of the decade and that prioritized: 
 
• relationships with other civil society groups; 
• collaborations with governmental units; 
• educational initiatives for law students, practitioners, and 
judges; 
• global outreach to bar associations, foreign clients, and foreign 
investors; 
• infrastructure; and 
• economic development.143 
 
Each of these points were emphasized in different ways between 2007 and 
2010 by having the SBL form sub-committees that were in charge of specific 
issues. For example, the SBL Committee on Arbitration forged a working 
partnership with Nigeria’s Chartered Institute of Arbitrators as well as with 
an organization known as the Negotiation and Conflict Management 
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Group.144 Other SBL sub-committees respectively collaborated with the 
Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies (to work on corporate 
governance matters), the Washington D.C.-based International Law Institute 
(to study public procurement processes), and the Ministry of National 
Planning (to strengthen antitrust measures in order “to underscore the 
importance of competition.”).145 Two additional collaborations were 
noteworthy. One was a joint partnership with the Ministry of Information 
and Culture and private sector tourism groups to help showcase the 
attractiveness of Nigeria to travelers. The other was a partnership with 
domestic and international intellectual property lawyers to convey a message 
to the global community that Nigeria was keen to protect the IP rights of 
investors, creators, and entrepreneurs.146 
Underpinning all of these activities by the SBL was the central principle 
that Nigeria could only thrive if it shed the shackles of corruption that 
burdened every aspect of life within the country. The rule of law needed to 
be seen as sacred, and the SBL was committed to using its new-found social 
capital and solid reputation to tirelessly promote this mantra. These values 
were demonstrated well in the context of how the corporate bar interacted 
with their foreign counterparts at the WTO, which was viewed by Nigerian 
business lawyers as a respected and necessary institution. As mentioned 
earlier, ensuring that Nigerian lawyers were familiar with the best practices 
of the WTO was of paramount importance during the inaugural conference. 
The organizers scheduled several “hot topic”147 panels on professionalism 
and the functioning of the WTO, which brought together experts from “the 
private and public sector, including representatives of multinational 
companies, private law firms, the Federal Ministry of Justice and the Federal 
Ministry of Commerce.”148 
This emphasis on the WTO continued during the SBL’s 2007 and 2008 
conferences.149 In fact, at the 2008 meeting three events occurred. First, a 
delegation from the Pan-African Lawyers Union attended. These 
representatives who came from around the continent requested that the NBA, 
and specifically leaders from the SBL, serve as “the mouthpiece of Africa at 
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various international fora” on trade.150 Second, the Attorney General of 
Nigeria agreed to have the SBL participate in the next round of Doha 
discussions, which involved the international community’s efforts to 
negotiate a global deal on trade and tariffs.151 And third, a detailed 
educational plan was formalized to train domestic lawyers to work on trade 
matters in foreign jurisdictions.152 
For George Etomi, these developments were significant steps in the 
evolution of the Nigerian corporate bar.153 However, he still believed that the 
only real way to permanently raise the international reputation of the legal 
profession would be for Nigeria to improve its overall image on the rule of 
law front.154 As such, the last two years of his leadership (2008–2010) 
focused on assisting the government on a number of anti-corruption 
measures.155 For example, the SBL advised policymakers on the best ways to 
enforce Nigeria’s Money Laundering Act.156 The government and the SBL 
also were involved in a campaign to encourage and de-stigmatize the practice 
of whistle-blowing.157 If people who witnessed corruption worried about 
being punished for reporting bad behavior, then the culture of corruption 
would only continue.158 
There was also a push to eliminate the prevalence of corruption in the 
country’s infrastructure sector.159 Nigeria’s roads, airports, and harbors all 
needed renovations.160 During the military years, the public-private 
partnerships to improve these areas were riddled with corrupt practices.161 
The SBL-leadership, under Etomi, argued that government officials, the 
business community, and especially lawyers had to understand that clean 
practices in the infrastructure space would be a major step forward in 
attracting foreign investors to come to Nigeria.162 
As 2008 ended, however, Nigeria had to grapple with a cataclysmic 
event that affected much of the international community. The global 
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financial crisis did not leave Nigeria unscathed. The Great Recession placed 
the country’s real estate and stock markets in turmoil and its banking and 
business law sectors in disarray. During 2009 and 2010, Etomi had the SBL’s 
annual meetings focus on how to help Nigeria recover. He and his leadership 
team assembled several working groups, panels, and seminars dedicated to 
ensuring that the Nigerian bar could be in the best position to advise 
interested parties on how to move forward.163 
Interestingly, within these conversations, there was a lingering 
sentiment that Nigeria’s difficulty in coping with the reverberating effects of 
the crisis was related to the milieu of corruption that had permeated the 
country for generations.164 At the same time, though, the SBL saw this 
moment as an opportunity, one which the rule of law could be championed 
as a remedy for not only resurrecting the economy but also for attracting 
foreign investment and consolidating the country’s latest democratic 
experiment. To that end, the SBL’s conferences in 2009 and 2010 
emphasized establishing respected and timely dispute resolution processes—
such as arbitration—that could be employed and relied upon by parties. In 
addition, advocating for improving the technology sector was hugely 
promoted.165 As the SBL-leadership argued, Nigeria wanted to be a global 
player. The only way to do so was to create a world-class technological 
infrastructure that would provide assurances to foreign investors that the 
country was serious about its intentions.166 And in order for modernization, 
democratization, and the formalization of a rule of law regime to occur, the 
first order of business was to eliminate the omnipresence of corruption. 
George Etomi stepped down as chair of the SBL in 2010.167 In the 
immediate aftermath, turmoil ensued due to tension that had been brewing 
between the broader NBA and the SBL.168 The former had increasingly 
become more skeptical of the latter’s focus on corporate and transactional 
law, as well as what it perceived to be an elitist attitude by the SBL towards 
the rest of the bar.169 In 2011, Etomi and his allies supported Mrs. Mfon 
Usoro to become the next chair.170 She served only six months before being 
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deposed by the NBA’s leaders. (The reasons for her dismissal vary 
depending on who one asks. 171) 
Thereafter, a well-known Senior Advocate of Nigeria, Charles 
Adeyemi Candide-Johnson, was named SBL-chair.172 Johnson was 
supported by the NBA, and largely for that reason the SBL refused to accept 
him as its leader. By 2012, he was replaced by Gbenga Oyebode, who, 
because of his stellar reputation as a commercial lawyer, was seen as a 
consensus selection. Oyebode served his full two-year term (2012–2014) and 
was then followed by Asue Ighodalo (2014–2016), Olu Akpata (2016–2018), 
and Seni Adio, who is the current chair of the SBL.173 
Today, the SBL continues to grow and build upon the ideas that were 
developed by Etomi and his colleagues in the early 2000s. Membership 
within the organization has risen to over 2,000 lawyers, and the signature 
annual conferences are now massive events that draw attendees from 
Nigeria’s major metropolitan cities, across Africa, and from Asia, Europe, 
and North America.174 Like with any group, however, there remain 
challenges that the SBL faces, including the Sisyphean task of figuring out 
how to eradicate the culture of corruption that still envelopes Nigerian 
society. The concluding section addresses these points next. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As the narrative above has revealed, there were multiple motivations 
for creating the SBL. Ensuring that the Nigerian corporate bar had its 
interests represented in government was, of course, a driving factor. But 
there were other reasons as well. The SBL wanted to educate and equip its 
members with the best practices from around the world so that they could be 
sophisticated, competitive global lawyers. There was also a keen desire to 
attract foreign investment. Establishing a cosmopolitan corporate lawyers’ 
association would be a signal to overseas investors that the Nigerian business 
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law sector could indeed provide necessary legal services. And perhaps most 
fundamentally, the SBL wanted to show the world that Nigeria could be a 
society where the rule of law was valued, clean governance was taken 
seriously, and consolidating a democratic system of government was a 
priority. 
For there to be a complete accounting of this story, however, there also 
needs to be a discussion of the challenges currently confronting the SBL. To 
begin, questions have emerged as to whether the SBL is concerned about the 
interests of lawyers outside of its niche. As already described, the vast 
majority of lawyers in the country engage in work that is far afield from what 
the corporate bar does. This fact has led many within the larger NBA to 
suggest that the SBL is too urban and too elitist.175 Furthermore, these NBA 
members have also asked whether the corporate bar now is too 
disproportionately powerful in terms of the influence it wields within 
government and civil society.176 They wonder whether it is time for the NBA 
to intervene and reign-in the SBL.177 For their part, SBL-leaders have 
recognized that this sentiment exists. While they reject the manner in which 
this issue has been framed, they concede that there must be a closing of this 
perception gap, if the group wishes to continue to be an effective voice for 
change within the country.178 
Another issue that has been of concern for those both within and outside 
of the SBL relates to gender. Since its founding, the SBL has only had one 
woman as its chair, Mfon Usoro. While an increasing number of women have 
played leadership roles within the organization, since Mrs. Usoro’s ouster in 
2011, the subsequent chairs have all been men.179 At the annual 2018 
conference, this concern about the lack of women in prominent posts once 
again emerged, which caused several of the group’s leaders to take note and 
to promise to address the matter in a more substantive fashion going 
forward.180 
For those who have argued for more inclusiveness of women in the 
strategic operations of the SBL, this issue is pressing. The demographics of 
the Nigerian legal profession are rapidly changing. Consider the structure of 
legal educational institutions within the country alone. Today, there are 
 
 175 See Interview with three high-ranking NBA litigators, in Lagos, Nigeria (June 18, 2017). 
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 178 See Interview with two SBL ranking members, in Abuja, Nigeria (June 29, 2018). See also 
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approximately fifty universities that award a first degree in law.181 As in most 
other parts of the world, law in Nigeria is studied at the undergraduate level. 
Upon completion of the degree, graduates who wish to practice law are 
required to enroll in what is called the Nigerian Law School (NLS). The NLS 
has campuses in six different cities across the country182 and provides the 
formal vocational training that aspiring lawyers must undertake before being 
called to the bar. Although precise numbers are not available, experts project 
that today women make-up anywhere from a third to almost one-half of the 
student population that is pursuing law as a career.183 Within a generation 
then, the Nigerian bar will have more women than it has ever had, and their 
demands for equality in all spaces—including within the SBL—will be even 
more vocal than they are at present. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the SBL-
leadership, in its promotion of making Nigeria a rule of law society, to take 
greater strides in ensuring that women play a larger and more substantive 
role in how the organization’s policies are crafted and ultimately 
implemented. 
In addition to a gender shift within the Nigerian legal profession, there 
has been a growing generational divide between the younger and more senior 
SBL lawyers, which has manifested most noticeably on the issue of whether 
to liberalize the country’s legal services market. Currently, Nigeria has what 
might be called a closed legal labor sector.184 Foreign law firms and foreign 
lawyers are prohibited from practicing law within the country or from even 
establishing a full-fledged presence.185 (There are “fly-in/fly-out” foreign 
lawyers who come in to negotiate or finalize deals, but they can only advise 
on their own home jurisdiction’s laws or on international law. And they 
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certainly have no standing to practice domestic law or appear in a Nigerian 
court. 186) 
At present, the debate is over whether the existing regulatory 
framework is acceptable as is, or whether changes need to be made. Many of 
the familiar arguments heard in other countries are echoed within the 
Nigerian context. For those who are in favor of liberalizing the current 
regime, they point to how the entry of foreign lawyers into the country will 
only accelerate foreign investment.187 After all, foreign companies naturally 
want their own lawyers on the ground for consultation and advising 
purposes. Liberalizing the legal services sector would also advertise to the 
world that Nigeria welcomes globally accepted standards for how clean, 
corporate law ought to be practiced.188 In addition, there are many younger 
Nigerian lawyers who would like to stay in their home country but who also 
seek greater global work opportunities.189 Allowing foreign firms to have a 
local presence offers such an option to them, along with providing them the 
potential of higher salaries and mentorship by lawyers to whom they 
otherwise would not have access.190 If ideas and best practices could be 
shared between international and domestic lawyers, it would strengthen the 
skill-sets of both sides, with liberalization leading to more business and 
enhanced profits for all involved, as well as offering a wider range of services 
to clients.191 
Many of the more senior lawyers within the SBL, however, see the 
entry of foreign lawyers in a different light.192 They argue that Nigerian 
clients need, want, and are already satisfied by the services they currently 
receive from the domestic bar. By contrast, foreign lawyers do not know the 
culture, languages, customs, and context of Nigeria; they only want access 
to the Nigerian market for exploitative purposes—business is stagnant in 
their own countries and consequently they are looking to “colonize” a new 
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terrain that will bring them new profits. In fact, domestic opponents fear that 
because of their size and wealth, foreign lawyers would come to Nigeria, 
offer legal services well-below market value, and thereby force local law 
firms either to close or be taken-over.193 Thereafter, the foreign lawyers 
would stand by themselves and be able to raise rates for their services 
without the fear of any domestic competition, and then move into areas such 
as courtroom litigation where the vast majority of Nigerian lawyers work.194 
Such a scenario has happened in other sectors, and these SBL-opponents see 
no reason why it could not happen in the legal services context as well.195 
This debate over whether foreign lawyers should enter Nigeria is one 
that has been simmering within the SBL for the last few years. It is not likely 
that the generational tension will abate any time in the near future. So, what 
will the outcome be? At this point, it is difficult to predict. Each side projects 
itself to be the protector and promoter of the rule of law and clean governance 
in this tussle. The bottom line is that for one side, foreign lawyers would help 
the SBL in raising the professional standards of the Nigerian bar; they would 
be strong potential partners in the efforts to fight corruption. Yet, the other 
side contends that foreign lawyers are the problem, and that their presence 
would only exacerbate corrupt behavior within the country. Consequently, 
there is a need to keep them at bay. 
One middle ground might be to consider phasing-in the liberalization 
process, with clearly defined “do’s” and “don’ts” for foreign lawyers if they 
are eventually permitted entry into the Nigerian market. For example, 
allowing a physical office-presence within the country but restricting foreign 
lawyers in their ability to practice and advise only on international law, 
international arbitration, and the laws of their home countries could be a 
start.196 If, over time, the disruption to the domestic bar was negligible, then 
perhaps “best friend partnerships” could be established, whereby a foreign 
firm and local firm could join forces, with the assurance that each side’s 
interests would be protected.197 An additional phased-in approach that some 
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jurisdictions have taken is to allow domestic lawyers to work for a foreign 
lawyer or foreign firm, but then to remove that domestic lawyer’s ability to 
practice local law so long as such a relationship continues.198 
These possible suggestions might allow for a compromise to be reached 
between the two sides. More broadly though, such a change to the regulatory 
framework could be the SBL’s biggest impact not just on the legal 
profession—but also on governmental policy to-date. Nigeria, recall, is 
looking to be in the next wave of Global South economic superpowers. For 
this transformation to occur, a massive, sustained infusion of foreign 
investment will be key. If the lessons of other jurisdictions are indicative, 
where foreign investors look to enter markets that are perceived to be freer 
and less restrictive, the resulting gradual liberalization of Nigeria’s legal 
services market could be an enormously positive signal that the country is 
truly open for business. 
To ensure that such a process runs smoothly and in a non-corrupt 
fashion, what better an organization to take the lead and navigate the 
doubtless hurdles that are certain to emerge, than the SBL? The first step, 
though, is for the organization to arrive at a consensus on how to proceed. If 
such an agreement can be reached, then this vibrant, entrepreneurial group 
of lawyers has a real opportunity to change the imagination of how the world 
views the Nigerian legal services market and maybe even the country as a 
whole. In sum, interested observers eagerly wait to see whether the SBL’s 
efforts to inculcate a rule of law culture within Nigerian society will take root 
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Notes: The total count equals 100 firms. 
 
